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ABSTRACT
There has been a recent explosion in the volume of communication between
constituents and their representatives in Congress.

There is an intradisciplinary

disagreement about what—if any—role this communication plays in the federal legislative
decision making process.

David Mayhew makes a persuasive argument based on

reelection realities that this input from constituents affects the legislative decisions made
by members of Congress. However, others, such as Robert Bernstein, maintain there is
no causal relationship between constituent input and the decisions made by members of
Congress.
In order to ascertain the degree to which this causal relationship exists—if it exists
at all—comparative content analysis techniques were used. Almost 3,500 pieces of mail
were received in one Congressional office during a four week period. This mail was
analyzed and compared to the sixty-nine roll call votes which took place during the same
month. The research question being asked was: what role did that constituency inputmeasured by mail received in the office—play in the legislative decision making process
of that member—measured by her/his roll call voting behavior?
The evidence revealed that this particular kind of constituent input played almost
no role in roll call voting. The additional logical research steps of comparing supportive
and opposing mail was not possible because of the lack of congruence between the mail
issues and the vote issues. However, in the few instances where there were votes
viii

on issues mentioned in some of the mail, the member’s votes were somewhat consistent
with the wishes of the constituents who contacted the office. These instances were scant,
however. By-and-large, the issues that caused people to write were quite different than
those voted on by members of Congress. There was no direction from constituents for
most of the roll call votes. In this case study, it was difficult for constituent mail to have
much of a role in Congressional decision making because the issues that constituents
wrote about were not even on the Congressional agenda.
However, before a sweeping conclusion is reached that constituencies have no role
to play in legislative decision making, it is important to remember that this research was
a case study and—out of necessity—omits key elements of potential constituent control
such as elite mail input and casework. In addition, the inclusion of all mail receivedincluding generated mail—diminished the role played by individual "non-generated" letters.

IX

To the blessed memory o f Phyllis Jean Layton Carlson, 1931-1992

A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government.
-James Madison

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is an understatement to say there is an intradisciplinary disagreement about
what—if any—role the constituencies of elected representatives play in the federal
legislative decision making process. Almost 3,500 pieces of mail were received in one
Congressional office during a one month period. This mail was analyzed and compared
to the sixty-nine roll call votes which took place during the same month. The research
question being asked was: what role did that constituency input—measured by mail
received in the office—play in the legislative decision making process of that membermeasured by her/his roll call voting behavior?
There is no widely accepted rule about what result to expect in a study of this
relationship. Views vary greatly. Parker states, "There is little question that constituency
attitudes and opinions are influential in determining roll call voting of Congressmen..."1
However, in contrast, Marger observes,
Many studies have indicated that there is little relationship between
electoral preferences and the responsiveness of legislators to those
preferences.2
Bernstein (1989), also says,
The myth of constituency control is not a harmless folk tale to be passed onto

'Glenn Parker, Characteristics o f Congress (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 171.
2Martin Marger, Elites and Masses (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987), 244.
1

2

future generations of students. It fundamentally misstates the relationship between
the constituency and the representatives.3
These are not new disagreements. The relationship between the ruled and the
rulers has been contemplated for centuries. The classic Greek philosophers were generally
against the average person having any say in the day-to-day operation of the government.
That was left up to those rulers who knew, it was thought, the appropriate courses of
action to take in pursuit of the common good.
The United States' political heritage is rich in the belief that the only way the
power of the government can be legitimate is by the consent of the governed. Even as
early as 1620, the Mayflower Compact set guidelines for local self-rule. John Locke, who
had tremendous influence in the foundation of the United States' government, argued, in
his 1690 Second Treatise o f Government, that people voluntarily consent to a political
authority in return for secure enjoyment of their liberties.4
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract, published in 1762, popularized the idea
of democratic self-government.5 He argued against the repressive forms of government
of the time and concluded that government should clearly be subordinate to the will of
the people. Wiser said,
Democracy for Rousseau meant direct or participatory democracy and as

3Robert Bernstein, Elections, Representation,
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 105.

and Congressional Voting Behavior.

4Ronald Pynn, American Politics (Monterey, CA: Brooks Cole, 1984), 44.
5James L. Wiser, Political Philosophy: A History o f the Search for Order (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 265.

3

such required the active exercise of political virtue by citizens who were
simultaneously both the subjects and objects of the political association.6
Clearly, the "will of the people" would be heard and play a large role in decision making
if all the people themselves—not elected representatives—were actually voting on each
issue, such as in New England town meeting situations. However such a pure, direct
democracy is rarely possible, and distinctly impossible in a nation as large and complex
as the late-twentieth-century United States.
John Stuart Mill accepted the necessity of representative democracy. He saw it
as the best possible form of government. He blended his Benthamite commitment to
popular self-rule with the Saint-Simonist argument that experts should be in ruling
positions. He concludes that the experts, or elites, should run the government but the
people retain the sovereign power of controlling them.7
When the founding fathers met in Philadelphia in 1787 to begin constructing a new
system of government for the newly formed free country, they had to contend with the
question of representation for the people under this new political authority. The idea of
self-rule had gained in popularity at the time of the Constitutional Convention but there
were restraints on the enthusiasm. Rossiter observes,
The men of 1787, who distrusted the plebiscitary democracy, deserve much credit
for the success of the constitutional democracy that was to establish itself in
America within two generations... Lacking an overpowering faith in the wisdom

6Ibid„ 268.
7Ibid., 315.
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and steadiness of the people,they nevertheless rested the new government upon the
broad base of popular sovereignty.8
Clearly, the founding fathers were leery of "the masses" having too much power. An
example of this concern is the original stipulation that senators be elected by the state
legislatures rather than by popular election—as they are now via the Seventeenth
Amendment adopted in 1913. In addition, the framers envisioned a much different and
active role for the Electoral College in the selection of the president. While developing
this new government, they sought to find an appropriate balance between true
representation of the people’s interest and restraint of the masses.
In response to this difficult task, they spent a noteworthy amount of time detailing
the legislative branch article of the Constitution. It is the longest and the most precise of
the seven articles. Janda, et al. point out,
In structuring their new government, the framers began with the legislative branch
because they thought law-making was the most important function of a republican
government.9
It is clear that law making is an important function of the federal government. It
is not clear, however, from a U.S. Constitutional standpoint, and it is even less apparent
from a philosophical standpoint, what role the constituencies should play in this law
making process.

Tocqueville, said,

So direction really comes from the people, and though the form of government is
representative, it is clear that the opinions, prejudices, interests, and even passions

8Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1987), 272.
9 Kenneth Janda, Jeffrey Berry, and Jerry Goldman The Challenge o f Democracy:
Government in America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 89.
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of the people can find no lasting obstacles from being manifest in the daily
conduct of society.1012*4
Our political heritage and the Constitution indicate that some influence is expected,
but how much is debatable.
Edmund Burke in his speech to the electors of Bristol identified two styles of
representation: delegates and trustees."

Delegates feel they must consult the people

they represent on pending matters and accept their instructions. The trustees feel they
must make decisions independently because their constituents have entrusted them to do
so. Political scientists went on to identify a third style: the politico. The politico vacillates
between the other two and determines when is the best time to act in each role, depending
on the situation.'2 The very existence of these classic delegate, trustee, and politico
descriptions of legislative roles demonstrates that there are different perceptions about how
much influence the constituents have.
Despite this lack of agreement on the role constituents play in the process, the
decision making and the constituent input continues.

In 1993, the House of

Representatives received 30,612,000 pieces of mail" and had 597 recorded votes'4.
Keefe says,

10Alexis de Tocqueville Democracy in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 173.
11Congressional Quarterly’s (CQ) Guide to Congress (Washington DC:CQ Inc., 1991), 505.
l2Ibid.
"David Dunn, Assistant Director, U.S. House of Representatives Post Office, interviewed
February 25, 1994, Washington D.C.
14Congressional Record, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), vol.139,
no. 168, D1389.
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Congress is the first branch of government. Its permanent importance is that it’s
positioned, both by the Constitution and by the expectations of many people, at
the center of national policymaking.15
Consequently, Congress is the primary avenue the governed feel they can utilize to let
their preferences for government policies be known.
By all measures, there has been an explosion in the volume of communication
between members of Congress and their constituents in the past twenty years. Incoming
mail to the House of Representatives has increased five-fold from 1972 to 1989.16 There
is little question that members of Congress consistently have the voters in their
constituencies on their minds. For example, Frantzich cites the following advice given
to a new member of Congress by a senior colleague,
Give close and prompt attention to your mail. Your votes and speeches may make
you well known and give you a reputation, but it is the way you handle your mail
that determines your reelection.17
How this mindset described above translates into policy is what this study explored.
The question about the role of constituencies in legislative decision making is not
new to political science. Particularly since the early 1970s, there has been a myriad of
studies analyzing it. The next chapter reviews the literature in this research area.

15William J. Keefe, Congress and the American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
1988), 1.
16Robert Vota, House Postmaster, Congressional Quarterly’s (CO) Guide to Congress
(Washington DC: CQ Inc., 1991), 508.
17Stephen Frantzich, Write Your Congressman (New York:Praeger, 1986), 21.

CHAPTER H
LITERATURE REVIEW
The true answer to the research question—what is the constituency’s role in
congressional decision making—is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Social science
research limitations make it truly onerous to operationalize the concept of constituency
opinion. There is no completely accurate way to operationalize it.

Public opinion is a

nebulous concept with many nuances and caveats. This problem is a constant theme in
this area of research.
The difficulty of defining constituency opinion is compounded in this, and other
studies, by the additional problem of identifying the difference between straight public
opinion and constituent pressure from the district felt by members of Congress. They are
different. People who contact their representatives tend to be more politically active.
They have a higher SES.1 Consequently, all research designs in this area fall short of
pinpointing these concepts exactly. Clearly, even this study identifying the mail that
comes into a congressional office as constituency opinion fails to encompass all of the
nuances of public opinion and constituent pressure.
The dominant feature in this body of research is the practice of measuring passive
constituency sentiment and not measuring active constituent input (mail). For the most

‘Robert Erikson, Norman Luttberg, and Kent Tedin, American Public Opinion (New York:
Macmillan, 1988), 7.
7
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part, researchers measured how constituents felt about issues by asking them (opinion
polls), or made assumptions about how the constituents felt based on their collective
personal backgrounds or their state's financial situation.
Interestingly enough, every study reviewed and apparently almost every study in
the field falls short of measuring actual individual constituent pressure. A word search
of the electronic files at the Library of Congress of article titles published from 1976-1994
in the following journals: American Journal o f Political Science, American Political
Science Review, American Politics Quarterly, Journal o f Politics, Legislative Studies
Quarterly, Policy Studies Review, Political Behavior, Polity, Public Opinion Quarterly,
and Western Political Quarterly produced no pertinent journal articles with the word
"mail" in the title. While further inspection of the journal titles produced an abundance
of related material, no journal research in the specific area of constituent generated mail
was found. It appears there is a research void of studies measuring active constituent
input. There is no widely publicized study of the letters and phone calls about legislative
matters that constituents send to their representatives in Congress. Consequently, this
literature review was broadened to include studies that utilized different measures to
operationalize constituency opinion.

Thirteen authors were reviewed. The difficult

challenge of operationalizing the concept of "constituency" opinion was met with varying
degrees of success by these authors. Depending on the focus of their study, they utilized
a variety of mechanisms to measure constituency opinion.
The results of these studies vary as greatly as the subjective opinions about the
topic. Most of the variations in the conclusions are—as is often the case—a result of how

9

their research design was set up and which aspect of the representation relationship they
focused.
It would be impractical to attempt to include all studies analyzing the effect of
non-mail measures of constituent opinion on the roll call voting behavior of individual
members of Congress. Instead, a cross section of the more straight forward studies will
be reviewed.
James Kau and Paul Rubin’s 1982 study of House votes to increase the minimum
wage employed maximum-likelihood estimates based on probit analysis to determine the
relative influence of each of the independent variables.2 Kau and Rubin utilized
questionable indirect measures of constituent opinion. Those variables were: constituency
opinion measured by 1) average hourly earnings in manufacturing, 2) the percentage of
workers unionized, 3) the percentage of black population in each district. They also
controlled for ideology measured by American for Democratic Action (ADA) scores, and
party.
The estimates measured the degree of influence an increase in an independent
variable has on the probability a member will support a vote to increase the minimum
wage. A negative estimate indicates an increase in the independent variable will increase
the probability the member will oppose raising the minimum wage. Their findings are
listed in table 1.
2James Kau and Paul Rubin, Congressmen, Constituents, and Contributors: Determinants
o f Roll Call Voting in the House o f Representatives. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 17.
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There was statistically significant constituency influence measured by average
hourly earnings in 1955, 1961, 1966, and 1974; and by percentage of black population
in 1966. Ideology was statistically significant in each time period of the study.
TABLE 1

RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY OPINION
MEASURED
BY:
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS,
UNIONIZATION OF WORKERS PERCENTAGE, AND BLACK
POPULATION PERCENTAGE; IDEOLOGY; AND PARTY; ON
HOUSE VOTING TO RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE MAXIMUMLIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES
1949

1955

1961

1966

1974

Constituency Opinion
Measured By
Average Hourly Earnings

1.38

*
1.36

*
1.45

*
1.39

•k
1.48

Constituency Opinion
Measured By
Unionization

1.23

1.21

1.17

1.22

1.18

-1.60

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Constituency Opinion
Measured By
Percent Black

-1.73

-1.61

-1.54

*
-1.67

*
1.77

*
1.97

*
1.97

*
1.90

*
1.90

-0.02

-0.15

-0.14

-0.09

-0.08

Ideology

Party

* SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL
SOURCE: Kau and Rubin (1982), 59.
This first study reviewed and the next seven are similar in design and are
characteristic of the vast volume of work published from the early 1970s to 1994. They
measure constituent input and determine if there is a causal relationship with votes on
similar issues.
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However, some of the constituency opinion measurements, such as those listed
above in the Kau and Rubin study, require immense leaps in logic. These studies were
included because there is an abundance of research using these questionable measures.
However, the drawbacks of these research design components are considerable and must
be noted.
The credibility of studies that attempt to compare the relative impact of
constituency opinion to congressional voting disintegrates when the singular measures of
constituency opinion are such far-removed concepts as average hourly earnings of
workers, percentage of the workers unionized, and the percent of the population that is
black as listed above. This is particularly troublesome because of all the literature like
this reviewed in this chapter, the studies utilizing the more questionable and far-removed
measures of constituency opinion were the studies that found statistically significant
associations between constituency opinion and roll voting behavior.
In addition, there are credibility problems with the many studies that identify a
member’s personal ideology by ratings from the Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA), Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), or similar groups such as in the Kau
and Rubin study above. This is particularly disturbing because in most of the studies
reviewed, ideology was found to be statistically significantly associated with decision
making.
ADA, ACA, and other group’s ratings are not always a close reading of the
personal ideology of members of Congress. They can be more accurately described as

voting histories of the members.3 This fact becomes clear when the rating process used
by the ADA and other groups is explored. The ADA selects twenty votes each in the
House and Senate that were important to their organization during the prior session of
Congress. They then assign five points to each vote and rate members of Congress based
upon whether or not they supported the .ADA’s agenda. A score of one-hundred is the
best; zero is the worst. On the surface this seems to be an accurate reflection. Senator
Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH) and Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN), both quintessential
liberals, scored very high—one hundred—on the ADA scale in 19934.
However, a moderate ADA rating would not be an accurate reflection, for
example, of a senator or congressman from a conservative state or district who in fact is
personally pro-gay rights—a liberal stance—but has always voted against gay rights for
politically expedient reasons. This member's ADA rating—based in part on his anti-gav
rights voting pattern—makes it appear he is personally more conservative on this issue.
However in this example, the member would not be personally conservative on this issue.
A possible explanation is that as a potential member of Congress he did not feel it was
worth alienating a large segment of voters—as poll results may have indicated he would
if he said he was pro-gay rights—and gave in to what the majority of the voters—his
eventual constituents—wanted him to do.

3Valerie Dulk, Program Director of Americans for Democratic Action, interviewed January
28, 1994, Washington DC.
4Amy Issacs, National Director of Americas for Democratic Action, interviewed January 28,
1994, Washington DC.
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This possible, and arguably likely, explanation of some member’s-policy positions
is of little importance to the ADA and other groups. A vote against their agenda is
against their agenda, regardless of the motivation. However, it is of great importance to
researchers who are trying to ascertain the extent to which representative democracy
operates.
Unfortunately, the use of ADA and other groups’ ratings for ideology is
widespread for the lack of more accurate alternatives. It would be impossible to get
reliable answers from politicians to the necessary questions such as: "which issues did you
feel were expendable enough to vote against your conscience in order to secure a political
victory?"

Consequently, the use of these ratings has set up research situations where it

appears the "ideology" category plays a very large role in determining congressional
voting decisions, but not only for the reasons the researchers conclude.
While voting history and actual personal ideology are not necessarily mutually
exclusive items, if they are not the same for some members on some issues it has serious
ramifications in the study of the role constituencies play in legislative decision making
because the influence of the constituents is camouflaged by an initial commitment to get
elected followed by an intact consistent voting history.

It is logical that a member’s

voting history is likely to repeat itself. Members do not like to be perceived as
"waffling".5 Consequently, it is highly unlikely they will vote out of character.

5Mail Manager for a member of Congress, interviewed November 1, 1993, Washington DC.
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Therefore it will appear as if ideology is taking precedent over constituency
preferences, when in fact it may be the opposite. The member may have given into
constituency pressure on some issues in order to get elected long before coming to
Congress and sticks to those positions because he does not want to risk the political fall
out of switching.
Fenno, in examination of this phenomenon, observes that politicians, when
developing their relationship with the public, go through two stages: an expansionist stage
and a protectionist stage.6 The early stage consists of assembling a group of supporters
that guarantees electoral victory. It is plausible that during this early stage a great deal of
constituent input takes place. However it is impossible to ascertain the extent of this
phenomenon in this study.
In his 1979 study of 1976 natural gas deregulation votes in the House, Edward
Mitchell argued that constituency support for passing deregulation bills could be
determined by: gas production in the district, current level of gas curtailment by the
regulations, percentage of homes heating with gas in the district, and average residential
gas consumption in the district.7 Again, these are questionable and indirect measures of
constituency opinion. Party, ideology based on ADA ratings, level of urbanization,
percentage of white collar jobs, and the member’s percentage of the vote in the 1974
election were controlled.

6Richard Fenno, Homestyle: House Members and their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1978), 172.
7Edward Mitchell, "The Basis of Congressional Energy Policy," Texas Law Review 57 (1979):
593.
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The author used multiple regression analysis to determine how much influence
each of these independent variables had on voting. He used the logit analysis procedure
relating variation in each of the independent variables to variation in the dependent
variable while holding constant the variation in each of the other independent variables.
Table 2 illustrates that the t-values from the regression analysis of constituency opinion
measured by gas production, ideology, and party, were statistically significant.
Chris Dennis, as reported in Bernstein (1989), studied tax egalitarianism in 1978
by examining seventy-six Senate votes on amendments to the Tax Reform Act of 1976.8
Votes for amendments that shifted after-tax money toward families below the national
median income level and amendments that shifted after-tax money away from families
above the national median income level were classified as pro-egalitarian votes. Senators
were rated on how many times they voted for pro-egalitarian policies.
Dennis used state median family income to determine the constituency opinion
variable, assuming that states with median incomes lower than the national median would
want their senators to be more pro-egalitarian and states with median incomes higher than
the national median would want their senators to be less egalitarian. This is a slightly
better but still questionable measure of constituency opinion. Ideology was determined by
ACA scores and party was controlled.

He measured the effects of the independent

variables while controlling for the effects of others by generating partial r correlation
coefficients.

8Chris Dennis, "The Revenue Side of Budgetary Politics: The Impact of Ideology on the Tax
Reform Act of 1976," in Robert Bernstein, Elections, Representation and Congressional Voting
Behavior.(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), 87-88.
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TABLE 2

MULTIPLE REGRESSION OF CONSTITUENCY OPINION
MEASURED BY: GAS PRODUCTION, GAS CURTAILMENT,
PERCENTAGE OF HOMES HEATING WITH GAS, AVERAGE
RESIDENTIAL GAS CONSUMPTION; IDEOLOGY; PARTY;
URBANIZATION; PERCENTAGE WHITE COLLAR; AND
MEMBER’S PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE IN 1974; ON VOTING
FOR 1976 NATURAL GAS DEREGULATION T-VALUES

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

TVALUES

Constituency Opinion
Measured by Gas Production

2.2*

Constituency Opinion
Measured by Gas Curtailment

1.1

Constituency Opinion
Measured by Percentage o f Homes Heating With Gas

0.8

Constituency Opinion
Measured by Average Residential Gas Consumption

-1.5

Ideology
Measured by ADA

-4.4*

Party

-3.8*

Urbanization

-0.6

Percentage White Collar

-0.8

Members’ Percentage of Vote During 1974 Election
VALUES OVER 1.64 WERE SIGNIFICANT
*SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL
SOURCE: Mitchell (1979), 612.

0.6
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Table 3 illustrates that there was no statistically significant association between
state median income and how high the senators rated on the pro-egalitarian scale. There
was, however, strong association identified between both party and ideology and how the
senator rated on the pro-egalitarian scale.

TABLE 3

PARTIAL r CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SENATOR’S TAX
EGALITARIANISM RATING AND CONSTITUENCY OPINION
MEASURED BY STATE MEDIAN INCOME, IDEOLOGY, AND
PARTY

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

PARTIAL r

Constituency Opinion Measured by
State Median Family Income

-0.07

Ideology
Measured By AC A Rating

-0.59*
0.33*

Party
♦SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL
SOURCE: Bernstein (1989), 88.

Robert Bernstein and Stephen Horn’s 1981 evaluation of voting on energy issues
in the House focused on five bills before the ninety-fourth Congress that would benefit
major oil companies.9 They developed partial r correlation coefficients to test the effect
of each independent variable while holding constant the effects of the other variables.
Table 4 illustrates the results of this research. The independent variables included the
ideology of the member based on ADA scores, party, and constituency opinion.

9Robert Bernstein and Stephen Horn, "Explaining House Voting on Energy Policy: Ideology
and Conditional Effects of Party and District Economic Benefits," Western Political Quarterly
34 (1981): 240.
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Constituency opinion was estimated by the amount of oil produced in the district,
assuming the constituencies with large oil production would support the bills. The larger
the oil production in the state, the larger the support would be. Again, this is slightly
better than previous studies’ measurements of constituency opinion but disregards
constituents who have nothing to do with the oil production business in the state and may
even be environmentalists and be opposed to oil production. The index of the dependent
variable was the representatives’ opposition to the bills.

Consequently, a negative r

indicates support of the legislation benefiting oil companies.
All of the coefficients are significant at the .01 level. With ideology and party
controlled, a partial r correlation coefficient of -.18 demonstrates that knowing
constituency opinion measured by the amount of oil produced in the district would help
you predict how the representative from that district would vote on the identified five bills
benefiting major oil companies. However, constituency opinion has a smaller r than
ideology or party. Consequently, knowing ideology or party would increase your ability
to predict a representative’s placement on the opposition to legislation benefiting oil
companies index.
Gillian Dean, John Siegfried, and Leslie Ward’s 1981 study of Senate voting on
the 1972 Family Assistance Program (FAP) considered constituency opinion and
constituency economic benefit as separate variables.10 Many studies are based on the
assumption that these two ideas naturally follow each other. The belief is that if there is

10Gillian Dean, John Siegfried, and Leslie Ward, "Constituency Preference and Potential
Economic Gain: Cues for Senate Voting on the Family Assistance Plan," American Politics
Quarterly 9 (1981): 344.
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a large amount of money to be gained by the state by passing a particular program, then
it is assumed the people of that state will support it. It is believed that they are positively
associated: the larger the amount of money, the larger the support.
TABLE 4

PARTIAL r CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN
CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO LEGISLATION BENEFITING
OIL COMPANIES AND CONSTITUENCY OPINION MEASURED
BY THE AMOUNT OF OIL PRODUCED IN THE STATE,
IDEOLOGY, PARTY

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Constituency Opinion Measured By
Amount o f Oil Produced In The State
Ideology

PARTIAL r
CORRELATION
COEFFICIENT
-0.18
0.77
-0.39

Party
ALL COEFFICIENTS SIGNIFICANT AT .01 LEVEL
SOURCE: Bernstein and Horn (1981), 240.

However, Dean, et al., argued that regarding FAP there was a negative rather than
a positive association between these two concepts. Constituency opinion polls showed
that the greatest support for this program came from areas of the country that would not
gain much money overall from this program, the wealthy northeastern states. In sections
of the country that would gain the most money as a result of FAP, the poorer southern
states, there was the most opposition.
The authors used ADA ratings to measure ideology, net aggregate economic
benefits for the states based on economic simulation of direct and induced economic
impacts, constituency opinion based on public opinion polls about similar programs, and
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a scale of support for FAP for each senator based on three prior votes concerning the
issue.
Using maximum-likelihood estimates from probit analysis to measure the impact
of each independent variable while controlling for the effects of the other variables, they
measured the degree to which an increase in an independent variable would increase
support for FAP. Negative estimates indicated that an increase in the independent variable
would increase opposition to FAP. Their results are listed in Table 5. Both constituency
opinion and state economic benefit failed to show a statistically significant role in the vote
on FAP while party and ideology did.
TABLE 5

RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF CONSTITUENCY OPINION
MEASURED BY PUBLIC OPINION POLLS, STATE ECONOMIC
BENEFIT, IDEOLOGY, AND PARTY ON SENATE VOTING
STANDARDIZED MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
Constituency Opinion
Measured By Public Opinion Polls
State Net Aggregate Economic Benefit

ESTIMATE
0.131
-0.859

Ideology
Measured by ADA Rating

1.179*

Party

0.530*

♦STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT AT THEOjB LEVEL
SOURCE: Dean, Siegfreid, and Ward (1981), 349.
The use of public opinion poll results as a measure of constituency opinion is a
more accurate reading of how all the people feel about an issue. However, it does not
necessarily reflect how some of the people are "pressuring" their representatives.
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For example, as described below, McCormick and Black found that during the six
months prior to the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty in 1977, a steady sixty percent
of the public—when asked—were opposed to passage of the treaty. However, it still passed
in the Senate by a sixty-eight to thirty-two margin."
The pivotal phrase is, "when asked." People may have opposed the treaty if they
thought about it but it is plausible that most people are too busy attending to the duties
of their day-to-day life to pay enough attention to foreign policy to "pressure" their
senator to vote against a treaty. Nevertheless, the results of a well-done, articulate public
opinion poll is an excellent reading of constituency opinion and a much better estimate
of constituency pressure than the mere potential economic gain of a state. Clearly those
people who live in the geographic constituency are the member's constituents but this
study is attempting to glean information about the pressure put on members of Congress
thorough the mail. The kind of people who write letters are not a representative sample
of the whole constituency as the people who answer a public opinion poll (hopefully)
would be.
James McCormick and Michael Black in their 1983 study of the effect of
constituency opinion on the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty votes speculated that closeness to
reelection, ideology measured by ADA-style ratings, party, region of the country, and past
history of supporting President Carter’s programs would affect a senator’s tendency to

"James McCormick and Michael Black, "Ideology and Voting on the Panama Canal
Treaties," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8 (1983): 48.
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vote for the treaty.12* They also differentiated between early deciders and late deciders,
speculating that some of the independent variables—such as public opinion-may play a
larger role in the decision making process of late deciders.

Table 6 illustrates their

results using standardized logit coefficients to measure the relative influence of each
independent variable.
TABLE 6

OPPOSITION TO THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES AND
REELECTION PROXIMITY, IDEOLOGY, REGION OF THE
COUNTRY, PARTY AND DEGREE OF CARTER PROGRAMS
SUPPORT STANDARDIZED LOGIT COEFFICIENTS

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

WHOLE
SENATE

EARLY
DECIDERS

LATE
DECIDERS

1.21

1.12

-0.46

-3.76*

-2.34*

-2.04*

Northeast Region

0.99

-0.15

1.71

Midwest Region

1.54

1.72

1.86

West Region

0.01

0.14

-1.19

Border Region

-0.76

0.16

-0.16

South Region

-1.80

0.08

-1.88

Party

-1.09

-0.39

-1.49

-0.55

-0.21

-0.34

Close Reelection Proximity
Ideology

Previous Carter Support
* SIGNIFICANT AT THE .05 LEVEL
SOURCE: McCormick and Black (1983), 54.

Senators, in both the early and late decider categories, who were up for re-election
in 1978, who arguably should have been the most in tune to their constituencies’
opposition to the treaty, were not shown to be more likely to oppose the treaty. Ideology

12James McCormick and Michael Black, "Ideology and Voting on the Panama Canal
Treaties," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8 (1983): 48.
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was the only variable to be shown to be statistically significant.
One of the earliest attempts to ascertain the role of the constituencies in
Congressional decision making is described in a 1963 article by Warren Miller and
Donald Stokes.

In order to explore this role they developed correlations between

constituency opinion and Congressional roll call voting behavior in three issue areas much
like the previously reviewed studies.14 Their research found varying levels—depending
on the issue area—of evidence of constituency opinion affecting roll call voting. The
constituency opinion on social welfare and roll call vote correlation was 0.3. The civil
rights correlation was better at 0.6 but with Southern districts excluded, this correlation
dropped to 0.2.

The correlation on foreign policy was slightly negative at -0.09.15

While this is a classic study and served as the basis for subsequent analysis, it was riddled
with sampling error.
Miller and Stokes’ measurement of constituency opinion was estimated by
characteristics identified in the Survey Research Center’s (SRC) 1958 Election Study.
The multi-stage random sampling procedure utilized by the SRC was designed for national
studies, not studies requiring district-specific information. Respondents were interviewed
from only 116 congressional districts. The average N per district was only thirteen.
Furthermore, there was great size disparity in the N per district, ranging from one to
thirty-one.

14Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence on Congress", American
Political Science Review 57 (March 1963):49.
15Ibid.
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-Robert Erikson recognized the sampling problems with the Miller and Stokes’ data
and, in an effort to overcome these obstacles, developed a new measure of constituency
opinion in a 1978 article reexamining Miller and Stokes’ study.16 He used simulation
to combine district characteristics into an index of constituency opinion.
First he generated a regression equation to predict individuals’ opinions from
background characteristic components such as blue collar/white collar, foreign stock/ U.S.
bom, nonwhite/ white, and urban/rural. Then he estimated aggregated mean attitudes for
each constituency as the weighted sum of the aggregated known population characteristics
of that constituency, with the weights provided by the unstandardized regression
coefficients of the initial equation.
By replacing Miller and Stokes’ sample-based estimate of constituency opinion
with simulation data, he found an increase in correlations between constituency opinion
and roll call voting behavior. The correlation for social welfare was 0.5, civil rights—with
Southern districts excluded—0.3, and foreign policy 0.3.17 He acknowledges simulation
is not—because of overlooked variables and lack of consideration for the local political
culture—a perfect measure either but makes a persuasive argument that it is a more
accurate reflection of the extent of the role played by constituencies in decision making
than the procedure used by the Miller and Stokes.

Erikson’s method of measuring

constituency opinion assumes that aggregate demographics will predict whether a

16Robert Erikson, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of
the Miller-Stokes’ Data." American Journal o f Political Science 22 (August 1978), 511.
17Ibid.
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constituency will support or oppose specific policies.
Christopher Achen was concerned that empirical studies in the area of
representation, such as the first eight reviewed in this paper, accept excessive
simplification. He points out that constituent input is not fixed and single legislative
districts do not act as a whole when putting pressure on representatives.18 He states
there is no normative framework to structure empirical research in this area. Achen goes
on to say,
In some instances, the expansiveness and delicate nuances of public opinion and
representativeness are relinquished for empirical precision. Other times, while
analytical theory supplies exactness, it is at the cost of sophistication and
universality.19
He makes persuasive arguments against using correlations and path coefficients to study
representation. In response to this research dilemma, he develops three new measures of
constituency representation, reflecting the liberal democratic concepts of equality and
popular sovereignty.
Proximity is one measure. It is based on the idea that all opinions in a district are
held in equal importance and fall on a horizontal axis. The center would be the place that
most of the views fall and—in order to be the most representative of his/her district—is
where the views of the elected official should be. They would be closest in proximity to
the majority of opinions held in their district.
However, Achen points out there is little the representative can do if this

18Christopher Achen, American Journal o f Political Science 22 August 1978, 476.
19Ibid.
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horizontal opinion axis is very long because of a wide variety of opinions in the district.
Even if the representative is in the middle, he/she may be far from some citizens on either
end. The poor proximity score may not necessarily be the fault of the representative if
they represent a diverse heterogenous constituency.
Centralism is, however, controlled by the representative. It is the unbiased estimate
of the squared difference between the representative’s opinion and the true constituency
mean opinion. It is a measure of the representative’s skill at minimizing his/her distance
from the mean constituent opinion.
Achen’s third and final measure is representativeness. It is based on a regression
equation: y = x +£ u ^

where y= the representatives opinion, u= the true constituent

opinion mean, £"= the disturbance term, ^(intercept)= expected position of the
representative’s opinion when the constituent opinion is ze-"

(slope)=the expected

change in the representatives opinion when constituent opinion changes by one.
The ideal unbiased system that all systems are compared to is an interception of
zero, =0 and a slope of one, =1. This illustrates that on average the representative has
the same opinion as the constituent mean; as the constituent mean changes so does the
representative’s opinion.
Herbert Weisberg examined and evaluated various theories of congressional roll
call voting.20 He explained that most legislative votes are easy to predict but no single
theory has been authenticated as the explanation for every prediction. There are still

20Herbert Weisberg "Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll Call Voting", American
Journal o f Political Science 22 (August 1978), 554.
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fifteen percent of the votes that cannot be predicted be a single model. He suggested the
nature of an organizing theory by developing an outline incorporating all the necessary
separate elements discovered in the theories he reviewed. 7
He states that time must be intrinsic to the framework. Individual votes are not
independent events and voting history must be considered. He went on to say that long
term policy dimensions, ideology, party, and constituency pressures can not be excluded;
nor can the short term influences of other representatives.
One of the most cited works on legislative decision making is John Kingdon’s
study of congressional voting. The original research for his book, Congressmen ’s Voting
Decisions, was conducted in 1969. The second and third editions, based on this original
research, have been adapted to encompass the current political landscape including the
ramifications of the variety of changes that have taken place during the last two decades.
Many feel this is a landmark study.
Decisions are Kingdon’s unit of analysis. He interviewed members of Congress
about recently taken roll call votes and asked them what influenced them to vote a certain
way on each vote, thus developing an opportunity to determine if different actors
influence congressmen at different times, and on different issues. He found seven actors
which affect congressmen’s voting decisions. These seven actors are: fellow congressmen,
constituency, party leadership, interest groups, the administration, staff, and reading.
Assuming spontaneous mentions of actors during the interview as the most
important indicator of influence, he identifies the congressmen’s constituency as the
second most important factor, exceeded only by the views of other Congressmen.
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Table 7 lists the percentage of the time each actor was mentioned by the
congressmen in the interviews following the votes.
TABLE 7

PERCENTAGE OF SPONTANEOUS MENTIONS AND MENTIONS
IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER QUESTION OF THE
FOLLOWING ACTORS: CONSTITUENCY (C.), FELLOW
CONGRESSMEN (F.C.), PARTY LEADERSHIP (P.L.), INTEREST
GROUPS (I.G.), THE ADMINISTRATION (A.), STAFF (S.), AND
READING (R.) BY 1969 CONGRESSMEN WHEN ASKED, "HOW
DID YOU GO ABOUT MAKING UP YOUR MIND ABOUT THIS
VOTE?"
S.

R.

KIND OF
RESPONSE

C.

F.C.

P.L.

I.G

A.

Spontaneous

37%

40%

10%

31%

25%

5%

9%

In Response to
Question

50%

35%

28%

35%

14%

29%

40%

Not
Involved

13%

25%

62%

35%

60%

66%

52%

Total N

222

221

222

222

222

221

221

Constituency was spontaneously mentioned thirty-seven percent of the time; fellow
congressmen, forty percent.

In response to a further questions, constituency was

mentioned most often, fifty percent of the time, leaving only thirteen percent of the time
that constituents were not mentioned as a factor in determining voting decisions. These
findings are bolstered by a number of observations. Kingdon (1989) states,
In a Congressman’s calculus, the probability of losing an election
may be quite low, but the cost (the end of his/her career) is
extremely high.21

21John Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1989), 62.
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He goes on to say, "You rarely find instances in which Congressman vote against the
intense feelings of any single group of constituents." 22 Kingdon’s study is based on a
Congressman’s perception of their own decision making process.
There is consistent evidence that members of Congress feel they are being watched
closely. However, there is equally consistent evidence that indicates they are not being
watched by the average constituent much at all. Parker (1989), in explanation of this
contradiction, says that the kind of constituents with whom members come in contact,
either through the mail or trips back home, are issue-oriented and politically active. In
addition, Kingdon identifies, "a tendency for successful candidates to have a rather high
opinion of the intellect of the average voter."23 Kingdon goes on to say that winners of
elections generally feel they won the election because the voters are ingenious while losers
feel the voters were duped by party labels and single-issue special interests voters.24
While Kingdon based his results on the member’s perceptions, Robert Bernstein
based his on the constituent’s perception of the congressional decision making process.
In Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior:

The Myth o f

Constituency Control, Bernstein argues—as the title suggests—that, "...nearly all members
of Congress can behave as free agents on virtually all issues with little fear of voter

22Ibid, 41.
23Glenn Parker, Characteristics o f Congress (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 177.
24John Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1989), 31.
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retaliation or promise of voter reward.."25 He makes a persuasive argument that there is
a lack of constituent knowledge of politics. He goes on to say this lack of awareness
makes it impossible for constituents to have any real influence on, or control of, their
representatives. He continues by indicating that the most important factor demonstrating
this phenomenon is that members will be more likely to go with what they personally feel
is best when faced with a decision where their personal preferences and those of their
constituency are different.
He acknowledges there are many times when a member and his constituency feel
the same way about an issue. He states this is merely a coincidence because members are
long-term residents of their districts and consequently have similar views. However, he
excludes these situations from the "constituency control" category. He argues that only
when the member is cross-pressured between their beliefs and their constituent’s beliefs
and they vote with the constituency there is "control." Given this research design, it is
understandable that Bernstein found almost no evidence of constituency control.
Donald McCrone and James Kuklinski explored the delegate theory of
representation.26

They argue that this theory dictates bilateral obligations on the

representative and the represented. For this theory to work, the representative must feel
compelled to react to what their constituencies say and the constituencies must send
signals identifying their preferences to their representatives. The authors reason that if

25Robert Bernstein, Elections, Representation, and Congressional Voting Behavior: The Myth
o f Constituency Control (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1989), 56.
26Donald McCrone and James Kuklinski, American Journal o f Political Science 23 (May
1979), 278.
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these two criteria are met, delegate representation takes place.

They conclude that

legislators and constituencies rarely express their opinions on the same matters. They
argue a more realistic design is that representatives and constituents share a pattern of
comprehension and consensus over a extensive realm of loosely-connected concerns. The
next chapter sets out to determine if this is the case.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH
Implicit in the fact that the franking privilege began as a service for mail both
coming to and leaving from Capitol Hill is the notion that members of Congress expect
to hear from their constituents. They do. In 1993, the House of Representatives Post
Office received 30,612,000 pieces of incoming mail.12 That is an increase from the
21,000,000 pieces received in 1992.3 Congressional incoming mail has increased 2000
percent in the past two decades.3 As expected, members of Congress have responded to
this constituent mail inflation with equal vigor. Studies show that the members' personal
staffs currently devote over fifty-five percent of their time answering the mail4 In 1988
the House out-going mail budget was $113 million.5
By all measures there has been an explosion of communication between
constituents and their representatives in Congress in the past twenty years. This study
analyzes one specific component of constituent/representative communications—the mail.

‘David Dunn, Assistant Director U.S. House of Representatives Post Office, interview,
February 25, 1994, Washington DC.
2C.Q.’s Daily Congressional Monitor, December 6, 1993, (Washington DC: C.Q. Inc., 1993),
4.
3David Twenhafel Setting Course: A Congressional Management Guide (Washington DC: The
Congressional Management Foundation, 1992), 226.
4Ibid.
5CQ’s 1990 Almanac (Washington DC: CQ Inc., 1990), 75.
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The content of the mail received in one member’s office was compared to the recorded
vote decisions made by that same member during a one month time period.
While some of the similar research reviewed indicates that there will likely be no
causal relationship between these two components, the concepts of representative
democracy and reelection realities indicate that the mail coming to the member would
affect her/his legislative activity.
Former Congressman Morris Udall viewed keeping in touch with constituency
opinion as an. "amalgam of civic virtue and political necessity."6 It is logical to expect
that issues— identified by letters—are important to the member’s constituents and will
therefore be important to the representative as well. As Congressman Udall’s comment
points out, even if the member perceived her/himself as predominantly a Burkean trustee,
she/he would have to be a delegate when politically necessary. In addition, it is important
to note that the literature reviewed in the previous chapter was based on similar but not
exactly the same research. Unlike other measures of constituency opinion, the mail in a
Congressional office comes from people who are more politically active than other
constituents. Therefore, it is logical that representatives would listen more closely to their
concerns because they are more likely to vote in the next election.
If a member receives a great deal of mail about an issue, it is plausible she/he will
assume this issue is of great importance to a vocal and active section of her/his
constituency and vote and act accordingly. An argument can be made—regarding some

6Donald Tacheron and Morris Udall, The Job o f the Congressman (Indianapolis:BobbsMerrill, 1970), 6.
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issues—if she/he receives a great deal of mail indicating opposition to a bill, and not much
mail in support of the bill, she/he will vote against it. It is unclear to what degree this
mail/voting relationship exists but it is logical to expect some relationship is there. This
study tests this hypothesis.
The issue categories generated by content analysis of the mail or "mail issues" are
the independent variables. They are expected to have some effect on the "vote issues" or
issues generated by the content analysis of the roll call votes, the dependent variables.
An indepth description of the member’s mail answering procedure is outlined
below. However, a description of the kind of mail analyzed must be presented first.
Fenno divides a member’s constituency into four categories displayed as concentric
circles, each smaller than the other. The largest, the geographic constituency, is made up
of all people in the geographic area which the member represents. This includes people
who voted against her/him, and people who don’t vote at all. Within the geographic
constituency is the reelection constituency, made up of the people who supported the
member during the last general election. The primary constituency, the next smaller
group, includes her/his most dependable supporters. They give the member money and
would guard against her/his electoral defeat especially in contested primaries. Finally, the
smallest group is the member’s "personal constituency" including close friends and
advisors.7

7Richard Fenno, Homestyle: Members in their Districts (Boston: Little Brown & Company,
1978), 1-26.
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Most mail answered personally by the member in this study was from her/his
personal and primary constituencies. Undoubtedly this group of elite constituents play a
large role in influencing the member’s voting decisions. However, the focus of this study
is the "average" participant of the member’s geographic constituency who has no personal
or political connection to the representative. Clearly it would have been interesting to
examine this elite mail but this was not possible because of the politically delicate nature
of this material. The openness and willingness of his office to assist in this research
project did, understandably, not extend far enough to include the member's personal mail.
Therefore, the most accurate description of the first step of this research would
be a content analysis of the "non-elite constituent legislative messages" the office received
during the month. The "non-elite" distinction is necessary because personal mail from the
member’s personal and primary constituencies answered directly by the member had to
be omitted.
The "constituent" differentiation is required because mail received from outside the
geographic district was omitted. The "legislative" term is required because any requests
for casework—including grant and rule clarification work; requests for White House tour
tickets, flags flown over the Capitol, or birthday greetings; and other non-legislative mail
was omitted.

The term "messages" is most accurate because while most of the

communication into the office was in the form of letters, messages sent via fax and
computer internet, as well as phone calls were analyzed. For the sake of brevity, unless
otherwise noted, future references to constituent "mail", "letters", and "writing" refers to
all of these forms of communication.
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Another important research point is that each message was counted equally. A
pre-printed postcard was given the same weight as a personal hand-written letter. While
there was tremendous effort made to minimize research design flaws, it is not possible to
eliminate them. This is most troublesome aspect of this study. It is not an accurate
reflection of reality. Postcards and other "generated" mail was not held in the same
regard by the staff and the member as other pieces. However, research limitations made
this particular component unavoidable.
In addition, if one person wrote on two different occasions—even if it was on the
same issue—during the month, each message was counted separately. While this could be
a problem in a study covering an extended time period, one month is not an adequate
amount of time for a constituent to write often enough to skew the results, particularly
considering the large total N, 3,403 . Also, if one constituent wrote about more than one
issue in a single letter, only the one dominant issue of the letter was counted.
The office had an extensive mail tracking system which was heavily utilized in
analyzing the content of the letters coming into the office. In order to understand the mail
issues content analysis procedure, the mail flow procedure in the office must be
understood.

After the mail was physically delivered to the member’s office in

Washington by the House Post Office it was all opened, date-stamped, sorted and logged
into the computer system.

The "non-elite constituent legislative messages" were

immediately assigned to a staff person to answer. The same person who was responsible
for advising the member in a particular issue area—the legislative assistant or LA—also
answered the mail in that issue area. This is one of any number of ways a member may
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choose to structure her/his office. Some offices have legislative correspondents or LCs
who only answer the mail and do not advise the member on legislative items.
In this office, after the LAs received the mail, they determined if the issue in the
letter had been previously addressed. They ascertained if they had written to someone
else about it previously. If they had, they assigned a "text code" to it.
A text code is the name of a standard letter or a "robo" written in response to—or
in anticipation of—a great deal of mail on a specific issue. Once approved, the LAs sent
these standard responses to constituents without any input from other staff members in the
office. Text letters were written by the LA and approved by the member. The member
did actually see—and in some cases have a hand in re-writing—these standard responses.
While she/he approved the letters to go out, she,die did not see even a diminutive
fraction—if any at all—of the mail that came in about issues answered by text letters.
From the office’s perspective that is the entire purpose of text letters: to cut back on the
number of people who need to see the response before it goes out to the constituent.
The first section of the research begins with this aspect of the tracking system.
There were 3,403 non-elite constituent legislative messages received in the office during
the month. Three thousand one hundred and seven or ninety-one percent were answered
with text letters. Rather than beginning by analyzing the content of every letter coming
into the office, the content of every letter going out of the office in response to the
constituent mail was analyzed.

On the surface it may seem to make more sense to

analyze the actual incoming constituent letters and under perfect research conditions it
would be. However, the office’s incomplete hard-copy constituent filing system and the
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hand-written and often legislatively vague style of most of the constituent letters, coupled
with the large N (3,404) and the member’s hesitance to allow these letters to be physically
taken out of the office prompted this different approach. It is safe to assume that the
letter sent out by the member’s office covered the issues addressed in the incoming
constituent’s letter.8
A list of all the text letters and the number of times each was used during the four
weeks was generated. Mail issue categories were created by combining the number of
text letters sent to constituents on the same topic. This initial content analysis of the mail
consisted of an evaluation—via text letter responses—of ninety-one percent of the mail
received. The remaining nine percent or 296 letters could not be analyzed using the same
procedure. A different approach was utilized.
These individually answered letters out of necessity were treated differently in the
office but the tracking system was equally extensive. When the LAs ascertained that a
new individual letter had to be written in order to answer the issues brought up by the
constituent, they wrote a response letter which was automatically assigned a "P" or
personal number by the computer system. The LA then obtained approval from the
Legislative Director (LD), or in some cases the Chief of Staff, had the letter proof-read
by the Press Secretary, and sent a hard copy response out to the constituent. Unless it
was a particularly difficult or entirely new topic, the member never saw the incoming
constituent letter or his outgoing response to these individual letters. Electronic records

8Mail Manager for a member of Congress, interviewed August 14, 1993, Washington
DC.
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of these P letters were kept in WordPerfect; filed by the month the constituent’s letter was
received in the office.
After the initial mail issue categories were established by the text code responses,
a subsequent analysis of every letter sent out of the member’s office in response to the
remaining nine percent or 296 letters was conducted. Appendix A lists the outcome of
these procedures. It lists the number of messages received in each of the mail issue
categories as identified by the letters sent out by the member’s office in response to
constituent mail.
The two highest mail issue categories, Social Security and abortion made up over
sixty percent of all the mail received. The remaining issues each make up less than nine
percent of the total N, most making up less than three percent each. Over thirty percent
of the mail she/he received was about preserving Social Security benefits. Visual analysis
of the actual constituent letters indicate that the vast majority of this mail was in the form
of pre-printed postcards. Appendix B contains samples of these Social Security postcards.
Abortion is the second highest category. The mail in this category includes both
pro-life and pro-choice mail. There were few postcards in this category; it was largely
individual letters.
As mentioned, the assumption in this research is that the mail was the independent
variable. However, some letters in at least one issue category defy this assumption.
Some of the mail came in as a result of previous votes rather than upcoming votes.
After the mail issue variables were determined the recorded roll call votes were
analyzed. During the four weeks analyzed, there were one hundred-seventy-seven votes
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in the chamber. Sixty-nine were recorded. Some of these recorded votes were not issue
related. It would not have been logical to assume constituents would have any input on
these non-issue votes. Votes on pro forma issues, previous question motions, and repeated
issues were omitted.
These omissions left forty-three of the sixty-nine recorded votes to analyze. The
summary of this analysis is included in Appendix C.
The overwhelming observation is that there is diminutive over-lap between the
vote issues listed in Appendix C and the mail issues listed in Appendix A. For the most
part, the mail issues are different from the vote issues. There were no votes relating to
65.37% or 2,225 pieces of the mail. In addition, 74.42% or thirty-two votes had no
direction from the mail.
However, in the few cases where there were letters and votes about the same issues
and it was possible to ascertain the constituents wishes by the outgoing letters, the
member voted predominantly the same as the constituent’s wishes. However, considering
the mail response structure of the office, it is not safe to assume that the member voted
this way because of the mail. Nevertheless, these cases are summarized and listed in
Appendix D.
With little seniority, the member could not play much of a role in Congressional
agenda setting. The roll call votes she/he participated in were largely reactive responses.
It is plausible that her/his proactive legislative activity in this time period could be more
reflective of the mail she/he received. However, an analysis of this activity indicates this
is not the case.
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During the studied legislative days, she/he sponsored one bill and signed on as a
co-sponsor to seven. Two were health care reform related and five were related to
agriculture and one was a resolution recognizing the anniversary of a peace organization.
The issues in the forty-one agriculture letters were not at all related to the
agriculture issues addressed in the legislation she/he sponsored and co-sponsored. In
addition, the health care mail did not include any specific concerns addressed in the health
care legislation the member so-sponsored. Finally, she/he received no mail about the
anniversary of the peace organization.
Clearly, the genesis for the pieces of legislation she/he sponsored and co-sponsored
was not the 3,403 non-elite constituent legislative messages this member received in
her/his office during that month.

There is little issue congruence in his proactive

legislative issues and the mail issues.
The following chapter explores the explanations for, and ramifications of, this lack
of issue congruence between both the reactive (roll call voting) and proactive
(sponsorship) legislative activity of the member and the mail issues.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The decisive conclusion reached by comparing the content of the mail issues and
the content of the vote issues is that there is little issue congruence. Even further analysis
of the member’s pro-active legislative activity produced little overlap. The issues that
cause people to write are quite different than those voted on by members of Congress.
In this case, it was difficult for constituent mail to have much of an influence on
Congressional decision making because the issues the constituents wrote about were not
even on Congress’ agenda.
However, in cases where there was overlap, the member generally voted as her/his
constituents who contacted her/him wanted. Again, particularly considering the mail
answering scheme in the office, it is not safe to assume the mail was the only reason the
member voted this way.
The evidence produced in this study of non-elite constituent legislative messages
showed this kind of constituent input had only a small—if any—role to play in the decision
process of this member in ther month studied. The exploration of both the product (roll
call votes) and the process (mail answering procedure in the office) produces this
conclusion. The further logical research steps of comparing the supporting and opposing
mail was not possible because there were no direct votes about issues that received a great
deal of conflicting mail.
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However, before a sweeping conclusion that constituencies have no role to play
in Congressional decision making is reached, the research design must be reviewed. First,
this is a case study and as such no sweeping conclusions about anything but this office
during this particular time period can be reached as a result of this research. This studyout of necessity—omits key elements of potential constituent control. For example, elite
mail that the member would manage her/himself was omitted. In addition, all mail was
treated equally—including postcards. This diminished the role individual personalized
letters may have. In addition, roll call votes and sponsorship of bills are not random
samples of activity in Congress. There are various behind-the-scenes activities that can be
beneficial to constituents and may have been done in response to some of the mail
received. Finally, casework, which was omitted from analysis in this study, has great
potential for legislative influence. In fact, the one piece of legislation sponsored during
this time period by this member was the direct result of a casework situation.1
The overwhelming evidence against constituent input does, however, prompt a
stream of logical questions.

Is the tens of millions of dollars spent each year on

congressional mailings a waste of taxpayer’s money?2 Is it simply a well-financed and
well-run reelection scheme for incumbents? What, if anything, does this exchange of
information produce that is helpful to constituents or the legislators? Revisiting the mail
answering procedure in the office produces some useful answers.

'Mail Manger for Member of Congress, interviewed November 1, 1993, Washington
DC.
2CQ’s 1992 Almanac, (Washington DC: CQ Inc., 1992), 48.
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While the member only saw a fraction of the mail answered in the office, the LAs
who answered the mail also advised the member on the same issues. It is plausible that
a personal letter about an issue that may come up in the future could serve as a red flag
for the staff person who will eventually be writing a briefing memo for the member about
that issue. In this instance, that constituent could have some influence. However, this
effect may be diminished by the unadulterated volume of mail received in the office.
Three thousand four hundred and four letters evenly distributed among eleven full-time
staff members is fifteen letters each staff member must answer every work day. It is
plausible that the staff member will not be able to remember very many issues brought
up by constituents in the mail because they have must read and answer such a high
number. Nevertheless, simply because the member did not personally see the letters is
not a reason to automatically assume the mail has no influence on the member. There are
many sources of information about legislation the representative may not see but the staff
does. The LA’s responsibility is to "assist with legislation." They distill all of the
pertinent available information about legislation into manageable amounts—usually a one
or two page briefing memos—for the member. It is logical that the member and the LA
deems input from constituents who are active enough to write—and consequently probably
active enough to vote—as pertinent information.
The general attitude in congressional offices is that most mail is a finger on the
pulse of the vocal (usually meaning politically active or single-issue) people’s concerns
back in the district and it is important to pay attention to it. However, it is also regarded
with some trepidation because the staffs perceive there is always too much of it and
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answering it is regarded as not as important as the other legislative duties in the
Washington office.

Also, many generated campaigns are based on misleading or

sometimes simply untrue facts and the explanations of the complete situation is much
more complicated than the constituents realized when they wrote or called.
Nevertheless, there are general cues that can be gleaned from the mail. In this
study for example, the sheer volume of Social Security and abortion letters in the study
reenforces to the staff—and therefore by extension the member—that these issues are
volatile and decisions about them should be handled delicately.
As discussed in the literature review section, a member does not want to appear
to be waffling. Any candidate would have had to have made a somewhat clear statement
about abortion before she/he was ever elected. The member analyzed in this study was
identified as a pro-choice candidate during the election.

Therefore, it is plausible that

mail about this kind of issue would have had little effect on the decision making process
of this member even when this issue is on the House’s agenda. She/He had already
publicly made up her/his mind and would most likely stick to that opinion.
Furthermore, the member received both pro-life and pro-choice mail on this issue.
Visual inspection of the actual incoming letters indicated there was a greater quantity of
pro-life letters but, as is often the case, there was no completely clear pressure to vote one
way or the other. The constituency did not have an opinion but rather had many and
sometimes conflicting opinions about this issue. Therefore, it would difficult to ascertain
what role this conflicting mail could play. As discussed, some of the mail about the
President’s economic plan came in as a result of the media coverage about it.
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People read about it in the paper, heard about on TV and this caused them to write to
their Congressman about it. As one staffer put it,
People write in about whatever is on the front page on their local newspaper.
Many times that has nothing to do with what is going on on the floor.3
The media is one of a variety of cues which cause people to write their
Congressman. The Catholic Church, for example, is very active in advancing their anti
abortion agenda and consequently there was a steady stream of anti-abortion mail received
in the office. The staff, however, knew this and treated this kind of "generated" mail
differently.
The office did have an informal information filtering system. A tabulation was
kept but a low priority was given to the pre-printed postcards requiring only an address,
a stamp and a signature on behalf of the constituent as displayed in Appendix B. In
contrast, some Congressional offices do not even answer postcards.
There is a great deal of information exchanged between constituents and
representatives. However, this study found scant evidence that constituency mail plays
much of any role in congressional decision making.

3Mail Manger for a Member of Congress, interviewed October 28, 1993, Washington,
DC.

APPENDICES

A P P E N D IX A , G E N E R A T E D P O S T C A R D S A M P L E S

The following page contains a copy of two representative samples of the many
postcards concerning the protection of Social Security benefits sent to the member.
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Dear Representative:

•

I am a Senior Citizen, a member o f The
Seniors Coalition and I live in your District. The
President is trying to balance the budget on the
backs o f Senior Citizens, and this is unfair! As.you
know, Social Security is actually running a surplus, j
i
!
I want you to oppose taxing or cutting Social
Security benefits. I’v e included my address. Please
let me know if I can count on you to protect my
Social Security benefits.
Sincerely,

Dear Representative:
As a Senior Citizen who lives in your district. I urge
you to sign The Seniors Coalition CONGRESSIONAL PLEDGE
which says:
“I Pledge to Oppose Any New Taxes
or Cuts in Social Security."
Social Security is a contract between the government and
its Senior Citizens.
It's wrong for the government to
break the contract now.
Remember, Social Security is not contributing to the
federal deficit — i t ’s running a surplus. So please
don't balance tb« KnAoaf
-friA.
trc /**r Cann
__
Thank you.
Sincerely.
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A P P E N D IX B , M A IL IS S U E S T A B L E

TABLE 8

NUMBER OF MESSAGES AND PERCENT OF TOTAL N IN EACH
CONSTITUENT MAIL ISSUE CATEGORY IDENTIFIED BY
LETTER RESPONSES GENERATED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL
OFFICE
NUMBER
OF
MESSAGES

PERCENT
OF
TOTAL N
(3403)

1131

33.24

Support for and Opposition to Abortion

825

24.24

Comments on the Budget

292

8.55

Opposition to Wetlands Policies

201

5.91

Support for and Opposition to Gays in the Military

156

4.58

Variety of Health Care Reform Issues

85

2.50

Variety of Cost of Living
Adjustments(COLA)/Retiree Issues

83

2.44

Support for and Opposition to a Variety of Tax
Issues

80

2.35

Variety of Issues Identified in a Businessowners’
Group’s Poll of their Members.

62

1.82

Variety of Education Issues

55

1.62

Support for and Opposition to the Balanced Budget
Amendment

47

1.38

Support for and Opposition to Proposed Additional
Wilderness Areas

43

1.26

Support for Making English the Official Language
of the United States

41

1.21

MAIL RECEIVED ISSUE CATEGORIES
IDENTIFIED BY THE MEMBER’S
RESPONSES
Support for Protecting Social Security Benefits
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MAIL RECEIVED ISSUE CATEGORIES
IDENTIFIED BY THE MEMBER’S
RESPONSES

NUMBER
OF
MESSAGES

PERCENT
OF
TOTAL N
(3403)

Support for Bread for the World’s "Many
Neighbors, One Earth" legislative Campaign

37

1.09

Variety of Agriculture issues

41

1.21

Support for Campaign Finance Reform

27

0.79

Concern Illegal Aliens are Overloading the Social
Service System

21

0.62

Support for and Opposition to Striker Replacement
Legislation and Other Labor Issues

20

0.59

Opposition to Potential Vitamin Prescription
Requirements

18

0.53

Concern about House Post Office Scandal

15

0.44

Support for and Opposition to Gun Control

15

0.44

Opposition to Safe Drinking Water Regulations

14

0.41

Support for and Opposition to Women in Combat

14

0.41

Opposition to Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Age 60 Rule

12

0.35

Support for the Federal Reserve System
Accountability Act

10

0.29

Opposition to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)

5

0.15

Concern about Civil War in Bosnia

3

0.09

Support of Reductions in Banking Regulations

3

0.09

Opposition to Higher Appraisal Thresholds in Title
XI of the Federal Institutions Reforms, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act

3

0.09

Concern about Tobacco Product Use

3

0.09

Concerns about Natural Disasters

3

0.09

Support of Boris Yeltsin

2

0.06
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NUMBER
OF
MESSAGES

PERCENT
OF
TOTAL N
(3403)

Opposition to Foreign Aid

2

0.06

Concern about Drug Enforcement Agency Raising
Fees

2

0.06

Variety of Housing and Title XIII Issues

2

0.06

Support for Special Coin Minting

2

0.06

Support for National Endowment for the Arts
(NEA) funding

2

0.06

Support for Better Intergovernmental Relations

2

0.06

Variety of Aviation Issues

2

0.06

Variety of Native American Issues

2

0.06

MAIL RECEIVED ISSUE CATEGORIES
IDENTIFIED BY THE MEMBER’S
RESPONSES
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MAIL RECEIVED ISSUE CATEGORIES
IDENTIFIED BY THE MEMBER’S
RESPONSES
Other Including One Letter Each of:

NUMBER
OF
MESSAGES

PERCENT
OF
TOTAL N
(3403)

20

0.59

3,403

100.05

*Support for Intelligence Agency Funding
■"Opposition to Sanctions against Norway because of
Whaling Efforts
■"Concern about Cutting Back the Post Cold War
Military Budget too Much
■"Concern about too Much TV Violence
“"Concern about Out-Of-State Waste
■"Opposition to Space Station
■"Support for Efforts to Solve MIA Questions in
Southeast Asia
■"Concern about Increased Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) Wind Resistance
Requirements
■"Support for Term Limits
"Support of Funding for the Small Business
Administration (SBA)
■"Support for International Trade Corridor
■"Concern about Availability of Welfare
■"Concern about Too Much Money Being Spent to
Rehabilitate Criminals
■"Concern about Child Abuse
■"Support for Ethanol in Gasoline
■"Support for Increasing the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s Power
■"Support for the National Service Program
"Support for Decreasing the Government’s power in
Civic Asset Forfeiture Situations
"Support for Requiring More Uniform Product
Liability Laws
■"Opposition to additional Civil Rights Legislation
TOTAL
(rounding error creates total > 100%)
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A P P E N D I X C , V O T E IS S U E S

TABLE 9

SUMMARY OF SELECT RECORDED FLOOR VOTES

VOTE
CAST BY
MEMBER

CHAMBER
ACTION

Sense of Congress that the Olympics in
the year 2000 should not be held in
China, passage.

NO

PASS

Grants Most Favored Nation (MFN)
trading status to China, passage.

NO

FAIL

Prohibits full public disc) sure of House
Post Office investigation reports, passage.

YES

PASS

Information Super Highway Act, final
passage.

YES

PASS

Coast Guard authorization of
appropriations for next fiscal year (FY)
final passage.

YES

PASS

Supplemental appropriations for current
FY,agree to conference report and clear the
way for Senate action.

YES

PASS

Current FY Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, (OBRA), motion
instructing House conferees to reject House
increases and stay within Senate increases.

NO

FAIL

OBRA
Motion instructing House conferees to
accept the Senate’s higher Social Security
thresholds.

YES

PASS

ISSUE, KIND OF MOTION
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VOTE
CAST BY
MEMBER

CHAMBER
ACTION

Maritime Administration authorization
of appropriations for next FY.en block
amendment regarding a variety of issues.

YES

PASS

Maritime Authorizations
Final passage of engrossed bill.

YES

PASS

Emergency flood relief appropriations,
amendment to include non-germane Job
Partnership Training Act language.

YES

PASS

Flood Relief Appropriations
Final passage of engrossed bill.

YES

PASS

NASA authorization of appropriations
for next FY, amendment cutting $18
million from the Consortium for
International Environmental Science
Information Network.

NO

FAIL

NASA
Amendment cutting $8 million from the
Consortium for International Environmental
Science Information Network.

NO

FAIL

NASA
Amendment cutting $38 million from the
Advanced Solid Rocket Motor Program.

NO

PASS

NASA
Amendment allowing NASA to purchase
helium from private sources.

YES

PASS

NASA
Amendment limiting next FY authorizations
to $3.1 million over current FY
authorizations.

YES

PASS

ISSUE, KIND OF MOTION
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VOTE
CAST BY
MEMBER

CHAMBER
ACTION

Appropriations for the Departments of
Commerce, Justice, State and related
agencies for next FY, amendment adding
$60 million for Immigration and
Naturalization Service.

NO

PASS

Departments of Commerce, Justice, State
and related agencies appropriations
Motion to recommit bill to the
Appropriations Committee with instructions
to restore $81 million in three law
enforcement areas.

NO

FAIL

Departments of Commerce, Justice, State
and related agencies appropriations
Amendment adding $22 million in funding
for U.S.A. travel and tourism marketing
abroad.

NO

FAIL

Departments of Commerce, Justice, State
and related agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $22 million from the
Small Business Administration.

NO

FAIL

Departments of Commerce, Justice, State
and related agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $10 million from
NASA’s facility construction budget.

NO

FAIL

Departments of Commerce, Justice, State
and related agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $26 million in order to
delete the Economic Development
Administration.

NO

FAIL

ISSUE, KIND OF MOTION
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VOTE
CAST BY
MEMBER

CHAMBER
ACTION

Appropriations for the Department of
the Interior and related agencies,
amendment cutting $8.7 million (5%) from
the National Endowment for the Arts
(NEA).

NO

PASS

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Amendment eliminating $174 million
(100%) NEA funding.

NO

FAIL

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $5 million in oil shale
research.

YES

PASS

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting fossil energy research
and development by $49.7 million.

NO

PASS

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting national forest system
appropriations by $11.8 million.

NO

FAIL

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $1 million from Fish
and Wildlife Service acquisition
appropriations for Stone Lakes (CA)
wildlife project.

NO

FAIL

ISSUE, KIND OF MOTION
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VOTE
CAST BY
MEMBER

CHAMBER
ACTION

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $14 million for
developing Presido (CA) military base into
a theme park.

NO

FAIL

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $3.1 million for
Steamtown.PA railroad museum.

YES

FAIL

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Amendment cutting $7 million from
National Trust for Historic Preservation.

NO

FAIL

Department of the Interior and related
agencies appropriations
Final Passage of Engrossed Bill.

YES

PASS

National Service Trust Act, amendment
insuring any appropriations for this
program will not affect appropriations for
Veteran’s programs.

YES

PASS

National Service Trust Act Amendment
eliminating personal liability of volunteers.

YES

PASS

National Service Trust Act
Perfecting amendment, places limits on
release of volunteer’s personal liability.

YES

PASS

National Service Trust Act
Amendment requiring a financial aid needs
analysis for program participants.

NO

FAIL

ISSUE, KIND OF MOTION
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VOTE
CAST BY
MEMBER

CHAMBER
ACTION

National Service Trust Act
Amendment guaranteeing current workers
will not be displaced by program
participants.

NO

FAIL

National Service Trust Act
Amendment requiring a fiscal triggering
device for the release of financial aid
money.

NO

FAIL

National Service Trust Act
Amendment requiring written policies of
institutional program participants stating
they will not assist illegal aliens.

NO

FAIL

National Service Trust Act
Perfecting amendment to allow religious
institutions participating in the program to
continue to provide spiritual guidance to
illegal aliens.

YES

PASS

National Service Trust Act
Amendment guaranteeing educational
benefits will not exceed 90% of GI Bill
educational benefits.

YES

PASS

National Service Trust Act
Final passage of engrossed bill.

YES

PASS

ISSUE, KIND OF MOTION
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APPENDIX D, MAIL AND VOTE ISSUE CONGRUENCE TABLE
TABLE 10

MAIL ISSU E
AND
SUMMARIZATION

MAIL
ISSUE

VOTE

ISSUE

CONGRUENCE

VOTE
ISSUE

CONSTITUENCY
OPINION
MEASURED
BY MAIL

MEMBER’S
ACTION

1131

OBRA.

support

support

33.24%

Motion
instructing
conferees to
accept other
chamber’s
higher Social
Security
thresholds

#
OF
MESSAGES
% OF
N

Concern about
Protecting
Social Security
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MAIL
ISSUE

#
OF
MESSAGES

VOTE
ISSUE

CONSTITUENCY
OPINION
MEASURED
BY MAIL

MEMBER’S
ACTION

National
Service Trust
Act,

support

against*

% OF
N
Concern about
Illegal Aliens
Overloading the
Social Services
System

21
0.62%

Amendment
requiring
written
policies of
institutional
program
participants
stating they
will not assist
illegal aliens.
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MAIL
ISSUE

#
OF
MESSAGES

VOTE
ISSUE

CONSTITUENCY
OPINION
MEASURED
BY MAIL

MEMBER’S
ACTION

Appropriations
for the
Departments
of Commerce,
Justice, State
and related
agencies,
Amendment
adding $60
million for
Immigration
and
Naturalization
Service.

likely
support

against*

Vote to
Prohibit full
public
disclosure of
House Post
Office
investigation
reports,

likely support

against

% OF
N
Concern about
Illegal Aliens
Overloading the
Social Services
System

21

Concern about
House Post
Office
Scandal

15

0.62%

0.44%
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MAIL
ISSUE

#
OF
MESSAGES

VOTE
ISSUE

CONSTITUENCY
OPINION
MEASURED
BY MAIL

MEMBER’S
ACTION

Emergency
flood relief
appropriations,
final passage.

support

support

Appropriations
for the
Department of
the Interior
and related
agencies,
amendment
cutting $8.7
million (5%)
from the
NEA.

against

against

% OF
N
Concern about
Effects of the
Mississippi
River Flooding

3

Support of
National
Endowment for
the Arts (NEA)
Funding

2

0.09%

0.06%
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MAIL
ISSUE

#
OF
MESSAGES

VOTE
ISSUE

CONSTITUENCY
OPINION
MEASURED
BY MAIL

MEMBER’S
ACTION

Appropriations for the
Department of
the Interior
and related
agencies,

against

against

support

support

% OF
N
Support of
NEA Funding

2
0.06%

Amendment
eliminat-ing
all ($174
million) NEA
funding.

Support of
National
Service
Program

1

National
Service,

0.03%
final passage
of engrossed
bill.
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MAIL
ISSUE

#
OF
MESSAGES

VOTE
ISSUE

CONSTITUENCY
OPINION
MEASURED
BY MAIL

MEMBER’S
ACTION

Appropriations
for the
Departments
of Commerce,
justice, State
and related
agencies,

against

against

% OF
N
Support of
Small Business
Administration
Funding

1
0.03%

Amendment
cutting $22
million from
the Small
Business
Adminis
tration.
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MAIL
ISSUE

#
OF
MESSAGES

VOTE
ISSUE

CONSTITUENCY
OPINION
MEASURED
BY MAIL

MEMBER’S
ACTION

Appropriations
for the
Departments
of Commerce,
justice, State
and related
agencies.

against

against*

% OF
N
Concern about
too much
money being
spent to
rehabilitate
criminals

1
0.03%

Motion to
recommit bill
to the Approp
riations
Committee
with instruct
ions to restore
$81 million in
three law
enforce-ment
areas.
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MAIL
ISSUE

#
OF
MESSAGES

VOTE
ISSUE

CONSTITUENCY
OPINION
MEASURED
BY MAIL

MEMBER’S
ACTION

NASA
Authorizations

support

support*

% OF
N
Opposition to
Space Station
Funding

1
0.03%

Amendment
limiting next
FY author
izations to
$3.1 million
over current
FY
authorizations.

*These votes, whi e not directly related to the specific concerns in the letters but
included because the general issues are the same.
In addition, the budget and some of the tax mail could have influenced the motion
to instruct conferees on the OBRA bill and the supplemental appropriations conference
report vote, but the specific issues mentioned in the mail where addressed in Committee
not on the floor—if they were addressed at all. The roll call votes, which are the focus
of this study, did not address the specific issues brought up in the mail. Instead, they
were general approval or disapproval of the whole programs.
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